Revealing the True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2)
by Reconciling "No Law to Apply"
with the Nondelegation Doctrine
Viktoria Loveit

INTRODUCTION

When Congress passes a statute conferring a large degree of authority upon the executive, it may implicate two potentially conflicting
legal doctrines: the nondelegation doctrine and the "committed to
agency discretion" exception to judicial review under § 701(a)(2) of the
Administrative Procedure Act' (APA).
The United States Constitution vests the president with all executive
powers to carry out the law.2 Given the vast number of laws that Congress has passed, the president is not capable of enforcing all of these
laws himself' Federal agencies, created by congressional statutes, perform
much of the work of the executive branch.' Many federal agencies operate as miniature versions of the tripartite federal government, with the
authority to legislate (through rulemaking), adjudicate (through administrative hearings), and execute agency policies (through agency enforcement).' This unique structure raises separation of powers concerns.' Congress enacted the APA to provide a structured framework for regulating
agencies and their unique role in the federal government.
t

B.S. 2001, Cornell University; J.D. 2006, The University of Chicago.
5 USC § 551 et seq (2000).
2
See US Const Art II, § 2; US Const Art II, § 3.
3
See Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498:A Test Case in PresidentialControl of Executive Agencies, 4 J L & Polit 483, 503 (1988) (noting that given the "plethora of laws
enacted by Congress, it is patently obvious that the president cannot personally execute every
law, but must rely on subordinates").
4
See Gary Lawson, FederalAdministrative Law 6-7 (West 3d ed 2004).
5
See, for example, Peter L. Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L Rev 488, 492-93 (1987) ("These agencies adopt
rules having the shape and impact of statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement decisions and other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the rights of private parties").
6
Id at 491 (noting the difficulty of giving content to the Constitution's separation of
powers principles in cases concerning government agencies). See also Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes; Precedent,and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a ConstitutionalTheory of the
Second Best, 80 Cornell L Rev 1, 11 (1994) ("Under a pure formalist approach, most, if not all, of
the administrative state is unconstitutional.").
7
See Alexander Dill, Scope of Rulemaking after Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33 Emory L J 953, 967 (1984) (describing how the APA was adopted to guard against
administrative arbitrariness and to address accountability and separation of powers concerns).
1
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The APA regulates the operation of federal agencies and sets out
the scope of judicial review of agency action. Under § 701(a)(2) of the
APA, the "committed to agency discretion" exception, agency action is
judicially unreviewable where the action is "committed to agency discretion."8 The Supreme Court has found that an action is "committed
to agency discretion" if the delegation to the agency is so broad that a
9
court cannot find any standard or "law to apply" to the agency action.
However, this same broad delegation can run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine stands for the principle that
Congress, vested with "all legislative powers" by Article I of the Constitution, cannot delegate these powers to another branch. ' The Supreme Court has held, though, that Congress may delegate some of its
authority," as long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to
guide the executive branch or agency therein.'2
The inherent conflict between the two doctrines is that they apply
the same test-whether there is an intelligible principle or law to apply to the executive action--but lead to opposite results." Under the
"committed to agency discretion" exception, when faced with a delegation lacking law to apply, a court should decline to review the
agency action, thereby expanding the agency's discretion to act. However, if a court can find no law to apply, it must similarly find that the
statute lacks an intelligible principle limiting the agency's authority. It
must therefore strike it down on nondelegation grounds, leaving the
agency with no discretion to act at all.' This suggests that delegations
committing action to agency discretion under § 701(a)(2) are unconstitutional. Yet the Supreme Court has, on several occasions, held that
agency action was committed to agency discretion, because the dele-

5USC§701(a)(2).
9 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402,410 (1971) (finding that
the agency's action was not unreviewable under § 701(a)(2) because the exception precludes
review only in rare cases where the statute provides "no law to apply").
10 The nondelegation doctrine applies to all three branches of the government; however,
this Comment discusses the doctrine only as it applies to Congress.
11 See, for example, United States v Grimaud,220 US 506,517 (1911) (finding that Congress
may delegate "power to fill up the details" under general provisions of law).
12 J.W Hampton, Jr., & Co v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body ... is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
13 See generally Amee B. Bergin, Does Application of the APA's "Committed to Agency
Discretion" Exception Violate the Nondelegation Doctrine?, 28 BC Envir Aft L Rev 363 (2001)
(arguing that the application of § 701(a)(2) under the "no law to apply" standard violates the
nondelegation doctrine).
14 Id at 393.
8
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gation provided no law to apply, without striking down the statute on
nondelegation grounds."

Although commentators have noted the conflict between the two
doctrines, 6 the Supreme Court has never addressed both doctrines in
the same case or spoken to how the contradictory doctrines can be reconciled. As a result, the apparent constitutional conflict between the
two doctrines-that a statute committing action to agency discretion
under § 701(a)(2) appears to violate the nondelegation doctrineremains unresolved. However, a careful examination of the Court's
nondelegation jurisprudence reveals a more accurate definition of the
committed to agency discretion exception that resolves the constitutional issue. Through an analysis of the Supreme Court's "no law to apply" and nondelegation jurisprudence, this Comment reveals the true
definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception and
thereby demonstrates that it does not conflict with the nondelegation
doctrine.
Part I of this Comment surveys the current state of the "no law to
apply" definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception
and the nondelegation doctrine, including the tension between the
two. Part II then explores and proposes a resolution of the constitutional conflict between the "no law to apply" definition of §701(a)(2)
and the nondelegation doctrine by concluding that a finding that a
statute commits action to agency discretion does not violate the nondelegation doctrine if the delegation is made in a realm where a nondelegation challenge to a statute would fail-areas that are beyond
the limits of the nondelegation doctrine. Based on this conclusion, a
new definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception is
proposed: agency action is committed to agency discretion where
Congress has provided no law to apply to the agency action and where
the agency is acting pursuant to lawmaking authority independent of
the congressional delegation. Part III demonstrates that the posited
definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception is the
15 See, for example, Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 834-35 (1985) (holding that agency
decisions not to take enforcement action are presumptively unreviewable under § 701(a)(2)).
16 See Bergin, 28 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 393-94 (cited in note 13). See also Sandra B.
Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond
the New Deal, 32 Ariz St L J 941, 993 (2000) ("A statute that provides 'no law to apply' lacks
guiding principles for either the agency or the court's edification, and therefore would be most
vulnerable to challenge as an improper delegation of legislative authority."); Peter L. Strauss,
PresidentialRulemaking, 72 Chi Kent L Rev 965, 977 (1997) ("[I]f we thought a court could not
[determine whether an agency acted within its statutory authority], that there was no law to
apply, we might quickly conclude that an improper delegation had occurred."); Donald A.
Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 Duke L J 657, 682-83 n 105 ("[Tlhe nondelegation
doctrine makes it unconstitutional for Congress to commit the exercise of legislative power
entirely to agency discretion.").
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true definition of the exception that the Supreme Court has employed
when it has found agency action committed to agency discretion under § 701(a)(2). Part III also explores the practical problems created
by the tension between "no law to apply" and the nondelegation doctrine. It then demonstrates how recognizing the true definition of the
exception resolves these problems.
I. SECTION 701(A)(2) AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

Although courts are frequently called upon to determine the law-

fulness of agency action, a court must first determine whether the
agency's action is subject to judicial review. '7 While there is a strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action, 8 the APA
defines two instances where agency action is not subject to judicial
review under the APA: (1) where Congress has explicitly precluded
judicial review under the terms of the governing statute,' and (2)
where Congress has committed particular actions to agency discretion.21 The second of these exceptions has caused confusion and controversy since its inceptionY
17 See, for example, 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law § 415 (2003) (indicating which agencies and actions are reviewable under the Hobbs Act).
18

Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 670 (1986). See also

Lincoln v Vigil, 508 US 182, 190 (1993) (recognizing a basic presumption of judicial review);
Abbott Laboratoriesv Gardner,387 US 136,140-41 (1967) (noting that judicial review of administrative actions is favored by the Supreme Court).
19 Sections 701(a)(1) and 701(a)(2) preclude judicial review of agency action only under
the APA. So, for example, pursuant to these exceptions, a court will not review agency action on
the grounds that it was "arbitrary or capricious." However, a court will still review agency action
on the claim that it is unconstitutional. Webster v Doe, 486 US 592,603 (1988).
5 USC § 701(a)(1).
20
21 See id § 701(a)(2). One might ask why Congress would ever preclude judicial review
under § 701(a)(2), when it could preclude review explicitly under § 701(a)(1). There is little to no
discussion of this question and, as noted later, the legislative history is unhelpful. The best answer
is that because Congress knew that it could not anticipate every circumstance where it will want
to preclude review under § 701(a)(1), it added § 701(a)(2) to preclude review where Congress
has not provided law and therefore left the decision up to the agency. In addition, even where the
executive has some authority to act, it may not have enough independent authority to take certain actions. In such areas, a broad delegation implicitly provides additional statutory authority
and allows the executive to do what it may be unable to do in absence of such delegation. See
note 87 for more on this last point.
22

See, for example, Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative

Law, 74 Minn L Rev 689, 692, 734 (1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has made little headway in defining the boundaries of § 701(a)(2) and that "lower courts have tortured and evaded
the formula in as many ways as they can contrive"); Sharon Werner, The Impact of Heckler v.
Chaney on JudicialReview ofAgency Decisions, 86 Colum L Rev 1247, 1248-49 (1986) (explain-

ing that the meaning of § 701(a)(2) has been the subject of controversy); Proceedings of the
Forty-Sixth JudicialConference of the Districtof Columbia Circuit, 111 FRD 91,173 (1985) ("The

language about no law to apply has caused a good deal of confusion in the lower courts because
the signals from the Supreme Court are contradicting.").
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Part L.A discusses the "committed to agency discretion" exception with a focus on the Court's application of the "no law to apply"
definition of the exception. The discussion highlights the vagueness of
the definition as well as the confusion and criticism it has generated.
Part I.B surveys the nondelegation doctrine and the "intelligible principle" requirement, noting that although the Court no longer strikes
down statutes on nondelegation grounds, the doctrine survives as a
canon of construction. This Part concludes by briefly pointing out the
conflict between "no law to apply" and the nondelegation doctrine.
A.

Section 701(a)(2): The "Committed to Agency Discretion"
Exception

The "no law to apply" doctrine of § 701(a)(2) engenders confusion among courts and commentators. The language, structure, and
legislative history of § 701(a)(2) provide little guidance for its application. A review of the origin of the "no law to apply" definition in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc v Volpe" and the Court's subsequent
applications of the test demonstrates that the "no law to apply" formula
fails to completely define the Court's conception of § 701(a)(2); the
Court's fact-specific determinations provide no real guidance for
lower courts. As a result, the scope of § 701(a)(2) and the "no law to
apply" formula remains ambiguous.
1. Background of § 701(a)(2).
The language of the APA "committed to agency discretion" exception and the structure of the APA offer modest direction to guide
courts in their application of the exception. The APA creates a framework that regulates the operation of federal agencies. It governs how
federal agencies may propose and establish regulations, and it defines
the scope of judicial review of agency action. Section 701(a)(2) of the
APA, which precludes judicial review of agency actions that are
committed to agency discretion, has troubled commentators, scholars,
and lower courts.'
401 US 402 (1971).
The scope of this review is laid out in § 706: agency actions, findings, and conclusions
must be held unlawful and set aside if they are, among other reasons, "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion," "unsupported by substantial evidence," or made "without observance of
procedure required by law." 5 USC § 706(2)(A)-(F).
25
An initial debate focused on whether § 701(a)(2) did in fact entirely exclude agency
action from judicial review. In 1965, Raoul Berger maintained, in a famous article, that Congress
had intended the APA to subject all administrative action to judicial review for abuse of discretion and that § 701(a)(2) did not entirely preclude judicial review. See generally Raoul Berger,
Administrative Arbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 Colum L Rev 55 (1965). His position pre23
24
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The language of § 701(a)(2) does not make clear when this exception to judicial review of agency action applies and what it requires
when it does apply.2 6 A formal reading of the exception suggests that in
every case where a statute gives an agency a degree of discretion, the
statute allows a range of administrative action that courts cannot review." Courts and commentators quickly abandoned this reading because courts routinely review agencies' exercise of discretionary
judgment and they found no indication that Congress meant to preclude review in all instances where agencies exercise discretion.8
A formal interpretation of the exception also directly conflicts
with another provision of the APA, § 706(2)(A), which requires courts
to set aside agency action for "abuse of discretion." This provision
specifically contemplates that (1) agencies will in fact have areas of
discretion, and (2) action within these areas will be subject to judicial
review." This seems clearly to conflict with a literal reading
of § 701(a)(2), which would prohibit review in instances where agencies were given discretion. Because § 706(2)(A) clearly provides for
judicial review in instances where agencies were granted some discretion, a literal reading of § 701(a)(2) would thus render § 706(2)(A)
meaningless.'O
The legislative history of the exception, like the plain reading of
the text, also fails to shed light on its purpose and meaning. The drafting legislators were in two camps: those who wanted to preserve review of all agency action and those who were in favor of a broad rule
against reviewability." After the drafters adopted what they knew to
be an obscure statute, legislators on both sides of the debate inserted
their interpretation of the exception 32into the legislative history, rendering it contradictory and unreliable.
cipitated "what is probably the longest-and possibly the most vitriolic-debate in the history of
law reviews, with Professor Kenneth Culp Davis" who challenged Berger's position in a series of
four articles to which Berger replied with four more of his own. Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 694-95
(cited in note 22), citing Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 Yale L J 965.
Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 695 (cited in note 22) (positing that the legislative drafters
26
of § 701 intentionally chose obscure and ambiguous language).
See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Sec27
tion Report, 38 Admin L Rev 239,250-60 (1986) (discussing the fronts upon which one can challenge an agency through judicial review, despite the agency acting under its discretion).
See Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 696 (cited in note 22) (noting that sponsors of the APA
28
disputed the interpretation that judicial review was prohibited whenever an agency possessed
some discretion).
Kenneth Culp Davis, "No Law to Apply," 25 San Diego L Rev 1, 2 (1988) (criticizing the
29
"no law to apply" formula).
30 Id.
See Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 695-96 (cited in note 22) ("[Als questions about the mean31
ing of [the] language surfaced, each side attempted to slant the legislative history in its favor.").
32

Id at 695-700.
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Unable to rely on either a formal reading of the exception or congressional guidance, courts forged their own way in applying § 701(a)(2).
Some courts applied a pragmatic balancing test in order to determine
when review was not appropriate." Others refused to recognize that
Congress could entirely exempt a class of agency action from judicial
review.' The Supreme Court finally entered the fray in 1971 and made
it clear that the "committed to agency discretion" exception does in
fact exempt certain agency actions from judicial review.
2. Overton Park and the birth of "no law to apply."
The Court first spoke to the "committed to agency discretion" exception to judicial review of agency action in Overton Park, holding
that the exception applies to preclude judicial review in those rare
cases where the governing statute provides no law to apply.31 In Overton Park, a group of citizens challenged the Secretary of Transportation's decision to build a highway through a city park. The plaintiffs
contended that the Secretary's action violated highway funding statutes that forbade the use of public parkland for highways, unless there
was "no feasible and prudent alternative."'' The Secretary, relying on
this statutory language, argued that the agency's decision was not subject to judicial review because it fell within the "committed to agency
discretion" exception. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that § 701(a)(2) "is a very narrow exception ... applicable in those rare

instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in any
given case there is no law to apply..... The Court then went on to determine that the statute in question clearly provided law to apply and
that the Secretary's action was therefore reviewable."

33
Id at 702-04 ("[L]ower courts tried to achieve a coherent understanding of section
701(a)(2) through a balancing test that called for weighing policy reasons for and against judicial
review.").
34 Id at 699 (noting one influential commentator's interpretation that the exception was
meaningless and merely declared that courts should respect legitimate exercises of agency discretion).
35 401 US at 410.

36

Id at 404 & n 2.

Id at 410-11.
Id, quoting S Rep No 752,79th Cong, 1st Sess 26 (1945).
39 Overton Park,401 US at 412-13 ("Plainly, there is 'law to apply' and thus the exemption
for action 'committed to agency discretion' is inapplicable.").
37

38
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3. Applying "no law to apply."
After Overton Park, the Supreme Court did not address the "no

law to apply" definition of § 701(a)(2) for fourteen years.4° When the
Court did eventually apply the "no law to apply" test to hold that

agency action was unreviewable under §701(a)(2), it did not rely exclusively on this test, but relied also on case specific arguments favoring
unreviewability. This has caused commentators to question whether the
"no law to apply" conception of § 701(a)(2) is still accurate. The

the "committed to
Court has, however, reaffirmed this definition of
42
agency discretion" exception as recently as 1992.
In Heckler v Chaney, 3 a seminal case applying the "committed to

agency discretion" exception, the Court held that agency decisions not
to act are presumptively unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).' In Chaney,

prison inmates sought a ban on the use of certain drugs for lethal injections after they had petitioned the Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) to take enforcement action and the FDA had refused. The
Court found in favor of the FDA and held that agency decisions not to
take enforcement action fall within the "committed to agency discretion" exception and are presumptively unreviewable unless Congress
states otherwise.
Although the Court invoked the "no law to apply" formula to

find that the statute committed action to agency discretion under § 701(a)(2), it is unclear whether the Court based its holding exclusively on this test.4' After briefly quoting from Overton Park and
restating the "no law to apply" test, the Chaney Court broke with this

line of analysis and began a thorough discussion of the factors that, for
After Overton Park, lower courts split in their application of § 701(a)(2). Some formalis40
tically applied the "no law to apply" formulation of the clause and declined to review agency
action when they felt that it contained no substantive guidance. See, for example, Jaymar-Ruby,
Inc v FTC, 651 F2d 506,510-13 (7th Cir 1981) (holding that the decision of the FTC to release its
investigative files was exempt from judicial review). Other courts simply reverted to the balancing test they had used pre-Overton Park. See, for example, Bullardv Webster, 623 F2d 1042,1046
(5th Cir 1980) ("There must be a weighing of the need for, and feasibility of, judicial review
versus the potential for disruption of the administrative process.").
41
See Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 734 (cited in note 22).
42
See Franklin v Massachusetts,505 US 788, 819 (1992) ("Nor is this an instance in which
the statute is so broadly drawn that 'there is no law to apply."').
43 470 US 821 (1985).
Id at 832 ("[A]n agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed
44
immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).").
45
Id at 837-38.
46 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach,79 NYU L Rev 1657, 1668 (2004) (noting that the Court did not actually use the "no law
to apply" test in Chaney); Levin, 74 Minn L Rev at 712 (cited in note 22) (arguing that although
most commentators have read Chaney as a reaffirmation of Overton Park, the Court actually
undermined the "no law to apply" formula by substituting it with a functional approach).
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policy reasons, reflected the "general unsuitability for judicial review
of agency decisions to refuse enforcement." 7 For example, the Court
noted that an agency must consider several factors before taking enforcement action, and reasoned that agencies are better equipped
than courts to weigh these factors."
In subsequent cases where the Court held that agency action was
committed to agency discretion, it similarly reaffirmed the Overton
Park "no law to apply" formula, but also relied on a range of practical
arguments weighing against judicial review of the agency action. The
Court has noted, for example, that it would not review a decision
taken by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because, short of cross-examining him about his views on national security, the Court had nothing on which to base its review.'Te Court has
also refused to review, under § 701(a)(2), agency decisions regarding
the allocation of funds from a lump sum congressional appropriation
because the Court concluded that the essential purpose of such an
appropriation is to allow the agency to determine the best way to
meet its statutory mandates.0 Thus, in finding agency action committed
to agency discretion, the Court looks not only to whether the statute
provides law to apply but also to the appropriateness of judicial review given the context of the agency action.
4. The current state of the "committed to agency
discretion" exception.
While the Court has continued to invoke the "no law to apply"
formula for determining whether an action is committed to agency
discretion, it has never relied solely on this formula when it has declined to review agency action under § 701(a)(2). As a result, the
Court has carved out various pockets where agency action is committed to agency discretion, such as agency decisions not to enforce, but it
has yet to articulate an overarching and administrable test for determining when agency action is committed to agency discretion. Are the
practical and other nonstatutory arguments that the Court has relied
on part of the "no law to apply" formula? Are they essential for finding unreviewability under § 701(a)(2)? Lower courts, agencies, and
lawyers are still uncertain as to what standards to employ in determin-

470 Us at 831.
Id at 831-32.
49
Webster, 486 US at 600-04 (finding that the CIA's decision to terminate an employee
was unreviewable but that constitutional claims stemming from the termination decision were
reviewable).
50 See Vigil, 508 US at 192.
47

48
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ing whether agency action is beyond judicial review' - the only certainty is that the exception applies only in rare circumstances.5 2
The "no law to apply" formulation of § 701(a)(2) has also been
criticized since it was first articulated in Overton Park for being both
vague and meaningless. In light of this pervasive ambiguity and criticism, the doctrine needs to be explored and explained.
B.

The Nondelegation Doctrine

In contrast to the congressionally created and not well understood "committed to agency discretion" exception, the nondelegation
doctrine is relatively well defined and rooted in the Constitution.'4 Article I provides, "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States."" From this clause, the Supreme
Court has inferred a constitutional prohibition against a congressional
delegation of legislative authority to the judicial or executive branch.6
Although this interpretation appears rigid on its face, the Supreme
Court applies it liberally. As this Part details, the Court has continued
to hold that the doctrine requires only that a delegation contain an
"intelligible principle" to guide those implementing the statute.7 This
Part then outlines the current state of the doctrine, noting that the
Court has liberalized its interpretation of the "intelligible principle"

51 See note 22.
52
Levin, 74 Mim L Rev at 702 (cited in note 22) ("Although courts have not enjoyed
much success in defining which administrative actions to treat as unreviewable, one premise ... is
uncontroversial: the clause applies to only a small fraction of all agency actions.").
53 See note 22. See also Ruth Colker, Administrative ProsecutorialIndiscretion,63 Tulane L
Rev 877, 891 (1989) (arguing that the "no law to apply" test is doctrinal and rigid); Levin, 74
Minn L Rev at 705-06 (cited in note 22) (noting that the Court's interpretation of § 701(a)(2)
makes the clause "mere surplusage" because if there are truly no standards to apply in reviewing
agency action-if there are no grounds on which to set it aside-then a challenge to the action
can be dismissed on the merits and there is no need for a clause that makes such actions unreviewable); Davis, 25 San Diego L Rev at 1, 10 (cited in note 29) (arguing that the Court misconstrued legislative history in formulating the "no law to apply" test and that the Court can "always
use its expertness in appraising reasonableness of administrative action") (emphasis omitted).
54 See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 371 (1989) ("The nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers."). But see Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Interringthe Nondelegation Doctrine,69 U Chi L Rev 1721,1722 (2002) ("In our view there just
is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been."); Kenneth Culp Davis and
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6 at 66-85 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1994)
(noting that no constitutional provision expressly says that Congress cannot choose to delegate
its power to others and that there is some debate as to whether the text and history of the Constitution justify the existence of the nondelegation doctrine at all).
55 US Const Art I, § 1.
56
See Mistretta,488 US at 372.
57 J. W. Hampton,Jr., & Co v United States, 276 US 394,409 (1928).
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requirement." Today the nondelegation doctrine exists mainly as a
canon of construction that is used to narrow broad delegations. 9
1. Nondelegation doctrine background and history.
Broad delegations implicate the nondelegation doctrine because

if they do not precisely prescribe agency action, the agency must make
its own rules and determinations. In doing so, the agency arguably
must engage in legislative lawmaking, which must be done by Congress.6° However, the Court has consistently held that the nondelegation doctrine does not bar the executive branch, in particular administrative agencies, from "filling in the details of ...6 general statutes or
new facts.", '

from applying legislative principles to
The Court first directly upheld a congressional delegation of legislative power to the executive in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co v United
States. The Court upheld the delegation because it provided an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated authority,

thereby cabining executive discretion.6 The Court reasoned: "Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission,
but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of
facts."' Thus, for the Court, as long as Congress furnishes an agency
with a guiding principle for the exercise of its delegated authority,
Congress does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.
58 Yakus v United States, 321 US 414,427 (1944) ("The directions that the prices fixed shall
be fair and equitable, that in addition they shall tend to promote the purposes of the Act ...
confer no greater reach for administrative determination than the power to fix just and reasonable rates.").
59 Mistretta, 488 US at 373 n 7 ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly,
to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be
unconstitutional.").
60 David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation
Doctrine,64 U Pitt L Rev 1,11-12 (2002).
61 Id at 11. See also UnitedStates v Grimaud,220 US 506,517 (1911) (finding that Congress
may delegate "power to fill up the details" under general provisions of law).
62
276 US 394 (1928). Prior to 1935, the Court had not based a holding on the nondelegation doctrine, although it continuously reaffirmed that delegations of legislative power to the
executive were unconstitutional. See, for example, The Brig Aurora v United States, 11 US (7
Cranch) 382, 385 (1813) ("Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the President.").
The Court had permitted some legislative delegations under the premise that they were not in
fact delegations of legislative power. See, for example, Field v Clark, 143 US 649, 692-93 (1892)
(upholding a delegation to the president by reasoning that he was not being delegated legislative
power but the authority to make factual determinations).
63
J W Hampton,276 US at 409.
64 Id at 408, quoting Interstate Commerce Commission v Goodrich Transit Co, 224 US 194,
214 (1912).
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After JW Hampton, the Court continued to employ the "intelligible principle" test in determining the constitutionality of congressional delegations. For example, the Court found that a statute allowing the president to ban interstate shipments of "hot oil," without providing any substantive or procedural standards to govern the decision,
failed to provide an intelligible principle and violated the nondelegation doctrine.6' Although the Supreme Court has not invalidated a
statute on nondelegation grounds since 1936, courts continue to apply
the "intelligible principle" test when faced with nondelegation claims.6
2. The current state of the doctrine.
Since 1936, the Court has consistently rejected nondelegationbased challenges to statutes by applying an increasingly liberal interpretation of the "intelligible principle" requirement.6' For example, the
Court found an intelligible principle in a statute instructing an administrator to fix prices that were, in the administrator's judgment, "fair
and equitable."6' Recently, the Court has applied the delegation doc-

trine primarily as a canon of interpretation.69 For years, the Supreme
Court has accepted the principle that courts should interpret statutes,
when reasonably possible, in a way that allows the court to avoid deciding constitutional questions."' Where a court is faced with a statute
65 Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388, 430 (1935). In addition to the "intelligible
principle" requirement, the Court has held that congressional delegations outside of the three
branches are presumptively prohibited by the nondelegation doctrine. See Carter v Carter Coal
Co,298 US 238,311 (1936) ("This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private
persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business.").
66 See, for example, The Pittston Co v United States, 368 F3d 385, 396 (4th Cir 2004) (finding that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act was a proper delegation because it defined the nature of the fund and other specifications); Tulare County v Bush, 306 F3d 1138,1143
(DC Cir 2002) (finding that the Antiquities Act includes intelligible principles to guide the president's action, and thus is not an improper delegation).
67 Mistretta, 488 US at 373 ("[After 1935] we have upheld ... without deviation, Congress'
ability to delegate power under broad standards.").
68
Yakus, 321 US at 427. The Court has also upheld a delegation instructing the executive
to make regulations serving "the public interest, convenience, or necessity." Id. These developments have led some commentators to conclude that the nondelegation doctrine is dead. See, for
example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of Judicial Review 132-33 (Harvard
1980). But see, for example, Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va L Rev 327,
330 (2002) ("The nondelegation doctrine ... is the Energizer Bunny of constitutional law: No
matter how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on going and going.").
69 Mistretta, 488 US at 373 n 7.
70 See, for example, INS v St. Cyr, 533 US 289,299-300 (2001) (noting that if an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an
alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible, a court is obligated to construe the
statute to avoid such a problem).
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that could potentially violate the nondelegation doctrine, the court
will interpret the statute in a way that does not present a nondelegation problem." A court does this by looking to various sources, such as
legislative history, custom, and the entire scope of the statute, in order
to find an "intelligible principle. '7 2 Thus, the nondelegation doctrine
has become a canon of avoidance.73
The Supreme Court's holding that legislative delegations to the
executive must contain an intelligible or guiding principle is in tension
with the "no law to apply" formula. If the nondelegation doctrine requires that legislative delegations contain a guiding intelligible principle, how can a statute that leaves courts without any law to apply to a
given agency action ever meet this constitutional prerequisite? It is
difficult to see how a broad statute that lacks any law to apply to an
agency's action can contain a guiding principle. As such, a statute that
contains no law to apply and commits action to agency discretion under § 701(a)(2) appears to be unconstitutional.
II. RECONCILING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE WITH

"NO LAW TO APPLY"

A comparison of the nondelegation doctrine and the "no law to
apply" formulation of the "committed to agency discretion" exception
presents some conceptual puzzles and may lead to the conclusion that
a statute that falls under the exception violates the nondelegation doctrine. A cursory look at the Court's jurisprudence does not shed light
on this dilemma, as the Court has never addressed the two doctrines
in the same case. As a result, it is not readily apparent how the potential constitutional conflict between the two doctrines can be resolved.
A careful examination of the Court's nondelegation jurisprudence
does, however, provide an answer by revealing the limits of the nondelegation doctrine, which demonstrate that the areas beyond the limits of the doctrine are the areas where agency action may constitutionally be committed to agency discretion. Recognizing the limits of
the nondelegation doctrine provides the answer to reconciling the
71 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 315 (2000) (arguing
that the nondelegation doctrine now consists of a set of canons subject to "principled judicial
application"). For a criticism of the use of the nondelegation canon, see Driesen, 64 U Pitt L Rev
1 (cited in note 60) (arguing that the judiciary's use of nondelegation canons aggrandizes the
judiciary at the expense of the other, more democratic branches).
72 See, for example, Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 676-85 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring) (observing that the Court often looks to
add a "gloss" to broad grants of legislative authority by examining the statute's legislative history,
purpose, factual background, and statutory context).
73 See, for example, id at 645-46 (narrowing the scope of the Occupational Health and
Safety Act).

1060

The University of Chicago Law Review

[73:1047

doctrine with the "no law to apply" formula and suggests an alternate
definition of § 701(a)(2).
Part II.A highlights the inherent conflict between the nondelegation doctrine and "no law to apply" and considers why, although frequently noted by commentators, the Court has never formally addressed the conflict. Part II.B explores the limits of the nondelegation
doctrine highlighted by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Loving v
United States.14 Part II.C proposes an alternate definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception that recognizes the relationship
between the two doctrines by placing the exception beyond the realm
of the nondelegation doctrine: agency action may constitutionally be
committed to agency discretion where Congress has provided no law
to apply and where the agency is acting pursuant to some independent
authority.
A. The Apparent Unconstitutionality of Finding No Law to Apply
The "no law to apply" formula and the nondelegation doctrine
appear to be in pointed tension." Both doctrines are triggered by
broadly written congressional delegations and employ the same test: is
there any guiding law or principle in the statute that circumscribes
agency action? If a statute is so broad that it lacks a guiding policy, the
statute may lack an intelligible principle, in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. However, if the statute lacks a guiding policy or principle, a court may find that it gives no law to apply and commits action
to agency discretion. The two doctrines lead to opposite results: the
second result significantly expands the agency's discretion to act, in
direct contrast to 7the
first result, which finds that the agency has no
6
power to act at all.
There are few cases where courts have discussed both the nondelegation doctrine and "no law to apply."" This is a likely reason why
the tension between the two doctrines has received limited attention.
There are several explanations for why the two doctrines do not frequently arise together. First, Congress typically provides law to guide
the agency in executing a congressional delegation.78 Therefore, there

74 517 US 748 (1996).
75
For a more thorough discussion of the apparent unconstitutionality of the application of
the "no law to apply" exception, see generally Bergin, 28 BC Envir Aff L Rev 363 (cited in note 13).

76

Idat393.

See generally Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association v Maritime Administration,215
F3d 37 (DC Cir 2000); Florsheim Shoe Co v United States, 744 F2d 787 (Fed Cir 1984). Both of
these cases will be discussed in Part II.C, and are cited in notes 112 and 115, respectively.
78 See John C. Deal, Banking Law Is Not for Sissies: JudicialReview of Capital Directives,
12 J L & Comm 185, 202 (1993) (noting that Congress is reluctant to preclude judicial review
77
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are few statutes implicating § 701(a)(2) in the first place. Second, the
nondelegation doctrine currently exists as a canon of construction; '9
courts rarely strike down legislation on nondelegation grounds. As a
result, litigants are unlikely to raise nondelegation arguments. "° Furthermore, the existence of the doctrine as a canon of construction may
mask instances where the doctrine and the "committed to agency discretion" exception do in fact interact. Courts may frequently use the
nondelegation canon to narrowly interpret statutes that implicate § 701(a)(2), thereby finding an intelligible principle or law to apply. In doing so, the court eliminates the possibility that the statute
commits action to agency discretion possibly without ever addressing
the issue. Moreover, courts do not always note that they are employing the nondelegation canon and sometimes employ the canon even
where the litigants have not raised a nondelegation attack."1 If courts
mention neither the nondelegation doctrine nor the canon, it is difficult to determine whether a case implicates both the nondelegation
and "no law to apply" doctrines. The lack of cases addressing both
doctrines allows the conflict to remain unresolved.
B.

The Limits of the Nondelegation Doctrine

Recognizing the limits of the nondelegation doctrine is the first
step towards reconciling the doctrine with the "no law to apply" definition of § 701(a)(2). Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress cannot delegate, and the executive cannot implement, a statute lacking an
intelligible principle because in order to implement such a statute, the
executive must engage in what courts have likened to legislative lawmaking. Under Article I, legislative lawmaking must be done by Congress. However, the executive branch may legislate without properly
delegated authority from Congress if the Constitution authorizes executive lawmaking in the subject area." Where there is such constitutional authorization, the executive has authority over the subject matbecause it relies upon the courts to require agencies to comply with Congress's wishes), citing
Bowen v MichiganAcademy of Family Physicians,476 US 667,681 (1986).
79 See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,373 n 7 (1989); note 59.
80 See Webster v Doe, 486 US 592, 599 (1988) ("Typically, a litigant will contest an action
(or failure to act) by an agency on the ground that the agency neglected to follow the statutory
directives of Congress.").
81 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 331-37 (cited in note 71) (discussing how courts employ
various substantive canons of construction, such as the presumption that legislation only applies
domestically, many of which embody the nondelegation canon).
82 Driesen, 64 U Pitt L Rev at 42 (cited in note 60) (discussing erroneous applications of
the nondelegation canon and noting that "[t]he Court has ... never demanded an intelligible
principle when the recipient of delegated authority has adequate independent constitutional
authority over the subject matter"), citing Loving, 517 US at 772-73, and United States v Mazurie, 419 US 544, 556-57 (1975).
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ter independent of the congressional delegation.& Therefore, in an
area where the executive has some authority to act independently of
the congressional authorization, rulemaking pursuant to a statute
lacking an intelligible principle does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine. In this scenario, the delegation is beyond the limits of the
nondelegation doctrine.
The Constitution vests different powers in each branch of the
government. In areas where the Constitution vests a branch with
power, it has independent authority to act. Some of the branches' authority is exclusive, such as Congress's power to make appropriations,3
and some is nonexclusive, such as the president's power to make treaties."' The Court has indicated that in areas where the executive has
some independent authority, even if the authority is concurrent with
that of Congress, broad delegations are constitutional." When Congress delegates to the executive in an area where the executive has
some independent authority, Congress can delegate more broadly
than would be permissible in the absence of independent executive
authority because Congress is merely expanding the lawmaking au3
thority that the executive already has."
The Supreme Court alluded to the limits of the nondelegation
doctrine in areas where the executive has independent lawmaking
authority in Loving. Loving, an Army private convicted of murder,
appealed his conviction on the ground that allowing the president to
define aggravating factors that permit the imposition of the death

penalty in military capital cases violated the nondelegation doctrine."
83 The executive has varying degrees of independent authority depending on the congressional authorization at issue.
84 See, for example, Glidden Co v Zdanok, 370 US 530,570 (1962).
85 See, for example, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551,622 (2005) (noting that the Constitution
empowers the Senate and the president to make treaties).
86 See, for example, Loving, 517 US at 772-73 (holding that Congress could delegate to the
president the power to define aggravating factors that permit the imposition of the death penalty
in military trials).
87 See, for example, United States v Curtiss-WrightExport Corp, 299 US 304, 319-20 (1936)
(upholding the power of the president to prosecute violators of an arms embargo because the
president is the "sole organ ... in the field of international relations"). See also Jules Lobel,
Covert War and CongressionalAuthority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U Pa L Rev
1035, 1102 (1986) (noting that although the president's general foreign affairs power in CurtissWright would not have been sufficient to authorize him to act independently of congressional
authorization, because the president had some power Congress was able to delegate broad authority in a manner that would have been impermissible if he had no power over the area). Note
that where the independent authority of the executive is not exclusive but concurrent, the executive's power may not permit it to act independently in the area absent congressional authorization, such as a delegation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 587, 592-639
(1952) (Jackson concurring) (discussing the scope of the president's independent lawmaking
authority).
88 Loving, 517 US at 759.
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The Court rejected Loving's nondelegation claim and held that the
nondelegation doctrine did not preclude the delegation."
In its holding, the Court stated that the issue in the case was not,
as Loving asserted, "whether there was any explicit principle telling
the president how to select aggravating factors, but whether any such
guidance was needed, given the nature of the delegation."", The Court
held that the relevant delegation was to the president in his role as
commander in chief and that this role required him to "take responsible and continuing action to superintend the military."'" The Court
therefore found that the delegation was "interlinked with duties already assigned to the president by express terms of the Constitution,
and the same limitations on delegation do not apply 'where the entity
exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent au-

'
thority over the subject matter. "'"
The Court has similarly upheld delegations lacking an intelligible
principle to voters, states, and Native American tribes, recognizing that
such delegations were beyond the limits of the nondelegation doctrine." For example, the Court held that a statute allowing tribes to
regulate the introduction of liquors into Native American Territory
was not unconstitutionally broad because Native American tribes
have attributes of sovereignty and the power to regulate their internal
affairs."' The Court has also extended this principle to areas where the
president has plenary authority under the Constitution." For example,
the Court upheld as a lawful delegation of power a statute authorizing
the president to determine whether an embargo on arms sales to foreign belligerents would contribute to world peace because the
presi'
'6
dent "is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations.

89

Id at 772-74.

Idat772.
Id.
92 Id, quoting Mazurie, 419 US at 556-57.
93
See, for example, Eastlake v Forest City Enterprises,426 US 668, 677-80 (1976) (upholding a city charter requiring voter ratification of land use changes because the people exercised
power reserved to themselves); United States v Sharpnack, 355 US 286,296-97 (1958) (upholding
a statute that allows states to dictate what constitutes a federal crime).
94 Mazurie, 419 US at 556-57.
95
See Loving, 517 US at 772-74 ("From the early days of the Republic, the President has
had congressional authorization to intervene in cases where courts-martial declared death.");
Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 319-20 (discussing the president's power to negotiate and make treaties on behalf of the United States). See also Youngstown, 343 US at 592-639 (Jackson concurring) (discussing the scope of the president's independent lawmaking authority).
96 Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 319-20 (internal quotation marks omitted):
90

91

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested
in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
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There are areas where agencies, like the president, have independent authority. While Congress creates agencies and defines the
scope of their authority, it is possible for an agency to have independent authority beyond what Congress has delegated to it. Courts have
recognized that agencies have some inherent powers. First, agencies
have inherent powers inferred from, implied from, or incident to the
express powers granted to them and duties imposed upon them by
Congress. These inherent powers include those which are reasonable

and appropriate for the agency to carry out their duties."
The ability of agencies to act pursuant to authority implied from
the powers granted to them by Congress is not boundless. Such authority is only implied to the extent that it is necessary to execute and
fulfill the laws and duties delegated to them by Congress." Addition-

ally, implied powers cannot contravene express statutory provisions
and limits laid down by Congress.a If Congress has provided law to
apply, an agency does not have implied powers that conflict with that law.

In addition, agencies have some inherent powers derived from
their location under the president in the executive branch.' 1 In order
to carry out his Article II executive powers, such as his role as com-

mander in chief and his power in the areas of foreign affairs and national security,' the president delegates his authority to other executive officers."" Executive agencies and departments exercise the execu-

tive powers of the president that are delegated to them. Because the
ernment in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress.
97 See 73 CJS Pub Admin Law and Procedure § 109 (2005). See also Carl W. Tobias, Of
Public Funds and Public Participation:Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse
Public Participantsin Administrative Proceedings,82 Colum L Rev 906, 923 (1982) ("[lIt is well
established that federal agencies possess implied as well as express statutory authority.").
98
Gallagher's Steak House, Inc v Bowles, 142 F2d 530, 534 (2d Cir 1944) ("[T]he lawful
delegation of a power carries with it the authority to do whatever is reasonable and appropriate
properly to effectuate the power."), citing McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
See also, for example, Royal Indemnity Co v United States, 313 US 289, 294 (1941) (recognizing
that the doctrine of implied authority extends to the disposition of the rights and property of the
federal government); United States v Bailey, 34 US (9 Pet) 238, 255 (1835) (holding that the
Secretary of Treasury had implied power to require oaths when paying claims); Gadda v
Ashcroft, 377 F3d 934,948 n 8 (9th Cir 2004) (recognizing the inherent power of courts to discipline attorneys); Ober v Whitman, 243 F3d 1190,1194-95 (9th Cir 2001) (suggesting that agencies
have the inherent authority to exempt de minimis violations from regulation); GTE Service Corp
v FCC, 782 F2d 263, 274 n 12 (DC Cir 1986) (recognizing the inherent authority of courts to
control dockets).
99 See 73 CJS Pub Admin Law and Procedure § 109 (cited in note 97).
100 Id.
101 Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833,

876 (2001).
102 See generally Curtiss-Wright,299 US 304.
103

See note 3.
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president is the "ultimate repository" of the power that Congress delegates to agencies and other officers of the executive branch, the presiand officers.' °
dent's Article II powers are attributed to these agencies
The powers an agency derives from the president are, like its implied powers, limited in that the agency may generally not rely on
them to act in opposition to Congress. To act in the face of congressional opposition, the executive must have exclusive constitutional
authority to act outside of, and against, the congressional delegation. ' ,
Otherwise, where Congress has provided law to apply in its delegating
statute, the agency cannot rely on independent authority to act in conflict with the statutory law.
When an agency acts within the bounds of its Article II powers, it
operates in a realm where the nondelegation doctrine does not apply.
Thus, in areas where an agency has independent authority, Congress
may, consistent with the nondelegation doctrine, delegate to the
agency without providing an intelligible principle."6
4

C.

The Constitutional Definition of § 701(a)(2): The "Independent
Authority" Exception

Recognizing the limits of the nondelegation doctrine allows it to
be reconciled with the "no law to apply" definition of the "committed
to agency discretion" exception: it is constitutional for a statute to
commit action to agency discretion by not providing law to apply if
the agency has lawmaking authority in the area of delegation independent of the congressional delegation.
Where an agency has independent authority either derived from
the president's constitutional powers or from its own implied powers,
it is not unconstitutional for Congress to provide no law to apply to
° "No law to apply" in this instance does not violate the
agency action.'O
nondelegation doctrine because, through the delegating statute, Con-

104 See, for example, Department of the Navy v Egan, 484 US 518, 527-30 (1988) (holding
that a decision to deny an employee security clearance was not subject to review in part because
of the president's authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national
security).
105 This case is analogous to Justice Jackson's Youngstown category three. This category
denotes the situation where the president acts in the face of congressional opposition. Jackson
notes that the president may constitutionally act in such a case only if the Constitution gives him
exclusive authority over the subject matter. In Jackson's category two, the president acts in the
face of congressional silence. In this instance, the president can act if the Constitution gives him
the power to do so absent congressional authorization. In category one, the president acts with
congressional authorization. In this instance, the president can exercise not only his but also
Congress's constitutional powers. Youngstown, 343 US at 634-39 (Jackson concurring).
106 For a discussion of why Congress would do this, see note 21.
107 See text accompanying note 82.
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gress has simply added to the agency's independent authority to act.""
If the agency has independent lawmaking authority in the relevant
area, it is not constitutionally essential that Congress provide an intelligible principle- Congress may commit agency action to the agency's
discretion. ' ' Therefore, a court may properly find that agency action is
committed to agency discretion only where the agency has independent authority, because it is only in this case that a delegation lacking a
law to apply is constitutional. In such a case, a "committed to agency
discretion" claim can succeed for precisely the same reason that a
nondelegation attack would fail-because the agency is acting pursuant to an independent source of authority.
Understanding that Congress may only commit action to agency
discretion by providing no law to apply in cases where the agency has
independent authority gives rise to a definition of § 701(a)(2) that
comports with the nondelegation doctrine: agency action may be
committed to agency discretion where (1) Congress has provided no
law to apply, and where (2) the agency is acting pursuant to independent lawmaking authority. The second condition, independent authority,
must be met, otherwise Congress has provided no intelligible principle
in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. Under the proposed "independent authority" definition, where Congress has provided no law to
apply but the agency does not have independent authority to act pursuant to the second condition, judicial review may not constitutionally
be precluded. In this case, a court must review agency action and discern law to apply."°
The "independent authority" definition reconciles § 701(a)(2) with
the nondelegation doctrine and also provides the reasoning behind the
exception. Where an agency is acting pursuant to a statute and its independent authority, it is not possible for courts to review the action
under the APA: courts cannot determine whether agency action is an
"abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious" in relation to the
delegating statute, because the agency has authority to act independent of the statute."' The agency action can be seen as both outside of
the realm of the APA and the nondelegation doctrine.

108 This situation is analogous to Jackson's Youngstown category one, where the president's
authority "is at its maximum." Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring).
109 Id.
110 See Davis, 25 San Diego L Rev at 9 (cited in note 29) (noting that courts frequently have
to review agency action when there is no clear law by, for example, employing the standard of
reasonableness).
Ill However, even where agency action is unreviewable pursuant to § 701(a)(2), courts can,
as always, review the action on constitutional grounds. Webster, 486 US at 600 (holding that
unreviewability under § 701(a)(2) did not foreclose judicial review of plaintiffs claims that his
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III. REVEALING THE TRUE DEFINITION OF § 701 (A)(2):
THE "INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY" EXCEPTION

The Supreme Court has held that agency action is unreviewable
and committed to agency discretion under § 701(a)(2) where the governing statute provides no law to apply to the agency action. However,
a statute lacking law to apply to agency action appears to violate the
nondelegation doctrine. Nonetheless, a statute lacking law to apply
does not violate the nondelegation doctrine if it operates in an area
where the executive has independent authority. By recognizing this
relationship between the doctrines, the "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2) resolves the exception's apparent conflict with
the nondelegation doctrine.
A review of circuit court and Supreme Court "no law to apply"
jurisprudence reveals that the "independent authority" definition
of § 701(a)(2) is the true definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception. The Court's jurisprudence reveals that when it
finds agency action committed to agency discretion it requires not
only that the statute provide no law to apply but also that the agency
have independent authority. The "independent authority" definition
accurately defines the court's conception of § 701(a)(2) and provides
an overarching definition of the exception that explains the Court's
"no law to apply" jurisprudence by cohesively tying together what
appear to be case specific holdings. Thus, the Court's application of
"no law to apply" has been consistent with the nondelegation doctrine
because the Court has applied it only where the agency had independent authority. A recognition of the true definition of § 701(a)(2) reconciles the exception with the nondelegation doctrine and more accurately defines the substantive law, thereby making the application of the
"committed to agency discretion" exception clearer.
A. Reconciling the "Independent Authority" Definition with
Circuit Courts' "No Law to Apply" Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has never addressed both the "no law to apply" and the nondelegation doctrines in the same case, and thereby
provides no direct guidance to test the posited "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2). However, where the D.C. Circuit and the
Federal Circuit have addressed the two doctrines simultaneously, their
holdings are consistent with the "independent authority" definition:
Congress may preclude agency action from judicial review by offering
no law to apply only if it does so beyond the limits of the nondelegadismissal violated his constitutional rights). For this reason Congress could not, through
§ 701(a)(1) or § 701(a)(2), shield a statute from being reviewed on nondelegation grounds.
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tion doctrine. The D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit cases show that
it is particularly in those instances where an agency acts beyond the
limits of the nondelegation doctrine that courts find the action committed to agency discretion.
The D.C. Circuit has held that the Maritime Administration's decision to transfer the registry of eight vessels from the United States
to the Republic of the Marshall Islands was committed to agency discretion because of the executive's plenary and independent authority
in the area of national defense and foreign policy. 112 The court also
went on to reject the claim that the delegation violated the nondelegation doctrine.11 3 The "committed to agency discretion" exception applied for the same reason that the nondelegation claim failed: because
114
the executive had an independent source of authority in the area.
Therefore, consistent with the "independent authority" definition, the
court declined to review agency action where there was both no law to
apply and independent authority.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has held that the Customs Service's
classification of imported Indian leather as dutiable merchandise was
committed to agency discretion; the executive branch's decisions concerning international trade are not reviewable because the executive
branch has independent authority in this area."' The court also held
that the delegation did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because
the subject matter of the statute involved international trade--an area
116
of foreign affairs, in which broad delegations are permissible. Again,
consistent with the "independent authority" definition, the court
found that an agency decision was unreviewable where the agency was
acting with independent authority beyond the realm of the nondelegation doctrine.
These two cases confirm the two-pronged "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2). The courts held that agency actions were
unreviewable where there was no law to apply and the agency had
independent authority to act.

112 Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association v Maritime Administration, 215 F3d 37, 41-42
(DC Cir 2000) (finding that reviewing the agency's decision would entail second-guessing the
executive's judgments on questions of foreign policy and national interest).

113
114

Id at 44.
Id at 41-42,44.

115 Florsheim Shoe Co v United States, 744 F2d 787,795 (Fed Cir 1984) ("[Tlhe Executive's
decisions in the sphere of international trade are reviewable only to determine whether the
President's action falls within his delegated authority.").
116 Id.

2006]

B.

Revealing the True Definition of APA § 701 (a)(2)

1069

Reconciling the "Independent Authority" Definition with
Supreme Court "No Law to Apply" Jurisprudence

Congressional delegations that lack an intelligible principle or
law to apply are constitutional only if the delegation is in an area
where the executive has independent authority. Interestingly, while the
Supreme Court has never articulated the connection between "no law
to apply" and the nondelegation doctrine, it has held that agency action was unreviewable under §701(a)(2) only where the agency had a
source of independent lawmaking authority. ' Like the circuit courts,
in the cases where the Court held that there was no law to apply, it
never relied exclusively on the language of the governing statute, but
instead also focused on nonstatutory reasons why the agency had discretion to act" 8-reasons that, upon examination, clearly derive from
the fact that the agency was acting within the scope of its independent
authority. Thus, the Court has implicitly required that two conditions
be met for agency action to fall within § 701(a)(2): that there be no
law to apply and that the agency have independent authority to act.
The current "no law to apply" definition articulates only one of these
conditions, while the Court has implicitly required both. The "independent authority" definition posited in this Comment incorporates
both conditions to arrive at the more complete definition of the "committed to agency discretion" exception that the Court has employed:
agency action is unreviewable under § 701(a)(2) where Congress has
provided no law to apply and where the agency has independent authority to act in the area.
The Court held in Chaney that executive decisions not to take enforcement action are committed to agency discretion." 9 En route to its
holding, the Court examined the governing statute and determined
that Congress had not provided law guiding agency decisions not to
take enforcement action. The Court then looked beyond the delegating statute to the larger context of the delegation, particularly the nature of the action and the agency's historical ability to act freely in the
given area."O The Court recognized that while it is the job of Congress
to make the laws, it is up to the executive to decide how it will enforce
and execute those laws. Agencies have independent authority derived
from their inherent executive powers to decide the manner in which

117 See, for example, Webster v Doe, 486 US 592,601 (1988) (finding that the statute giving a
CIA Director complete discretion did not violate the nondelegation doctrine).
118 See, for example, Chaney, 470 US at 831-32 (discussing reasons behind enforcement and
prosecutorial discretion).
119 Id at 838.
120 Id at 831-32.

1070

The University of Chicago Law Review

[73:1047

they execute the laws.'2 ' In declining review, the Chaney Court found

that both conditions of the "independent authority" definition were
met.
Similarly, the Court in ICC v Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers... held that the agency's refusal to reconsider a decision was

committed to agency discretion.'23 As in Chaney, the decision was to
rehear a petition related to the manner in which the agency executes
the laws. The Court held that just as a body with enforcement power
has discretion not to take enforcement action, a body that makes
judgments on party claims has the discretion not to review its previous
determinations."' An agency has independent authority to make such
determinations stemming from its executive and implied agency powers. Thus, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Court again
denied review where Congress had not provided law to apply and
where the agency was acting pursuant to its independent authority.
In Webster v Doe,' 2' a CIA employee contested the grounds of his

termination and the Court held that the CIA Director's decision to
fire the CIA employee was unreviewable under § 701(a)(2). This hold-

ing also comports with the "independent authority" definition
of § 701(a)(2). The Court first found that the governing statute did not
provide the agency with law to apply to employee termination deci-

sions.' After making this determination, the Court again went on to
discuss the nature of the agency and the decision to terminate before

conclusively finding that the decision was committed to agency discre117
stressed that the CIA plays an integral role in the
tion. The Court
executive's ability to carry out its foreign affairs and commander in

121 Id at 832, citing US Const Art II, § 3. The Court emphasized that decisions not to enforce
require the agency to balance and assess many factors, such as its chances of prevailing in the
action, competing uses for its limited budget, and its regulatory priorities. Because these factors
are within the agency's expertise, judicial supervision of such choices would be impractical and
unwise. Chaney, 470 US at 831-32.
122 482 US 270 (1987).
123

Id at 282.

Id at 281 (stating that a tradition of nonreviewability exists with regard to refusals by
agencies and courts to reconsider for material error). The Court also held in Lincoln v Vigil, 508
US 182 (1993), that decisions on how to spend lump sum appropriations were not reviewable
after likening them to agency decisions not to enforce. Id at 191-92. Again, the agency had independent authority derived from its implied powers.
125 486 US 592 (1988).
126 Id at 600 (noting that the statute allowed for termination of an employee when the
Director deemed such termination necessary or advisable, "not simply when the dismissal is
necessary or advisable").
127 Id.
124
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chief powers.'28 In this way, the Court importantly recognized that
whether an agency decision is reviewable is not only rooted in the
relevant statutory language, but also in the specific nature of the
agency and the tasks it was established to perform. The president's
commander in chief and foreign affairs powers provide a definitive
basis for independent authority in Webster. The lack of law to apply
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because, like the president
in Loving, the intelligence director derives independent authority
from Article II. Consistent with the "independent authority" definition, the Court could find that the decision was unreviewable because
Congress did not provide law to apply and because the director was
acting within the scope of his independent authority.
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has found agency action
committed to agency discretion when Congress has not provided law
in the governing statute and where there are various nonstatutory
arguments in favor of unreviewability. A close look reveals that the
nonstatutory arguments in each case stem from the presence of independent agency authority to act. It is because the agency has this independent executive authority that the Court's initial finding that
there is no law to apply does not render the governing statute an unconstitutional delegation. The Court's jurisprudence confirms the "independent authority" definition: the Court holds that agency action is
committed to agency discretion where the statute provides no law to
apply and where the agency is acting pursuant to some independent
authority.
C.

Resolving Current Difficulties with the "No Law to Apply"
Definition

The "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2) facilitates a
necessary reconciliation between the "no law to apply" formula and
the nondelegation doctrine. The necessity of this reconciliation arises
from the fact that the "no law to apply" definition appears to violate
the nondelegation doctrine and because neither courts nor commentators understand this traditional definition of § 701(a)(2).'2' This confusion has led to a range of practical difficulties for courts, legislators,
and litigants faced with broad congressional delegations. A recognition of the true "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2)

128 Id at 601 ("Section 102(c) is an integral part of that statute, because the Agency's efficacy, and the Nation's security, depend in large measure on the reliability and trustworthiness of
the Agency's employees.").
129 See note 22.
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remedies these difficulties by explicitly recognizing the relationship
between the two doctrines.
Under the traditional definition of "no law to apply," an agency
could argue that a broad delegation lacks law to apply and commits
action to agency discretion. This line of argument, however, may leave
the statute particularly vulnerable to an attack on nondelegation
grounds. This conflict raises a problem for the agency's defense of its
actions: how does the agency make its case that there is truly no law to
apply from the statute to its action, while defending the statute against
an attack that it lacks an intelligible principle? Because the "no law to
apply" defense does not respond to the nondelegation attack, the
agency is forced to walk a delicate line, arguing that the statute contains an intelligible principle yet maintaining that it nevertheless provides no law to apply.
The "independent authority" definition of § 701(a)(2) resolves
this difficulty because it clearly establishes the relationship between
the nondelegation doctrine and § 701(a)(2). In order to prevail on the
claim that the agency's action is unreviewable, the agency must show
that it has independent authority to act, without having to refute a
claim that the statute lacks an intelligible principle. Therefore, litigants
do not need to make an argument that bolsters their case while weakening it at the same time. The "independent authority" definition
of § 701(a)(2) collapses the nondelegation and the "no law to apply"
arguments into one, allowing both the court and the litigants to focus
on the crucial question once it has been determined that the statute
lacks law to apply: whether the agency has authority to act independent of the congressional delegation.
Another D.C. Circuit case further demonstrates the difficulties
created by the tension between the "no law to apply" and the nondelegation doctrines. In Rainbow Navigation, Inc v Departmentof the
Navy,"O Rainbow Navigation, a U.S. shipping company, accused the
Navy of violating the Cargo Preference Act (CPA), which stipulates3
U.S. forces.11
that U.S. ships must be used to transport sea supplies for
An exception in the CPA permits the president to issue contracts to
foreign shippers if he finds that the rates charged by U.S. shippers are
"excessive or otherwise unreasonable.' 32 Rainbow Navigation brought
a claim after the Navy revoked the preference that the company had
been granted for the shipping route from the United States to a U.S.
base in Keflavik, Iceland.

130

783 F2d 1072 (DC Cir 1986).

131

Id at 1073-74.

132

Id.
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The Navy based its decision to revoke Rainbow's preference and
grant it to Icelandic shippers on diplomatic and security reasons, but
officially invoked the "excessive or otherwise unreasonable" clause in
the CPA as the basis for its decision.'33 The Secretary argued that the
Navy's decision was committed to agency discretion because it entailed sensitive foreign relations matters.'" The court held that the decision was reviewable because "excessive or otherwise unreasonable"
referred to monetary considerations only and provided law that the
court could apply."'
However, the court noted that the Secretary's decision was reviewable only because the Secretary had invoked the "excessive or
otherwise unreasonable" exception as the basis for its decision.'6 If the
Secretary had instead declared that he was basing its decision on foreign affairs concerns, the court would likely have declined to review
its action.' 3 In this case, the Navy would not have been acting under its
statutory authority but under independent foreign affairs powers derived from the president. The court's analysis in that circumstance
would have focused on whether the Navy had constitutional power, as
opposed to statutory authority, to take the contested action.
The relevant point from the case is that Congress had initially
written the CPA to give the president full discretion to suspend a national cargo preference whenever he deemed it desirable in the interests of national defense.'" However, Congress rejected this language in

favor of that ultimately adopted'39 because it feared that courts would
invalidate the original statute on nondelegation grounds. '4 Congress
failed to recognize that the statute as written would have been beyond

the limits of the nondelegation doctrine, because the Navy, through
the president, would have been acting pursuant to independent au133 Id. Icelandic shippers were upset by their exclusion from the route and the issue became
a source of considerable friction in U.S.-Icelandic relations. The Secretary of State declared his
fear that this friction might result in retaliatory action by Iceland. Id.

134

Id at 1078-79.

Id at 1079-80 (noting that the court could determine whether rates charged were reasonable).
136 Id.
135

137

Id at 1075.

See id at 1077. The original language was as follows: "[T]he President of the United
States may from time to time suspend, in whole or in part, section 1 of this act whenever, in the
interests of the national defense or for the protection of the interests of the Government, such
suspension may seem to him desirable." Cargo Preferences Act, S 2263, 58th Cong, 2d Sess, in 38
Cong Rec S 2408 (Feb 26,1904).
139 "[U]nless the President shall find that the rates of freight charges by said vessels are
excessive or otherwise unreasonable ....
Rainbow Navigation, 783 F2d at 1077, citing Cargo
Preferences Act, 38 Cong Rec at S 2474-77 (cited in note 138).
140 See Rainbow Navigation, 783 F2d at 1077 (noting that the principal proponent of the
change argued that the presidential finding must be something specific).
138
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thority. Congress was free to offer no law to apply and commit the
action to agency discretion because the agency would remain free to
act in accordance with Congress's desire pursuant to the agency's independent authority. Had the relationship between the nondelegation
and the "no law to apply" doctrines been clearer, Congress could have
enacted the legislation as initially written. Instead, Congress amended
the language of the exception and limited the Navy's discretion to act
statute.14
under the governing

In Rainbow Navigation, a governing statute was unnecessarily
amended in order to avoid invalidation on nondelegation grounds.
The case demonstrates how the tension between the traditional "no
law to apply" definition and the nondelegation doctrine creates difficulties for courts, legislators, and litigants, including agencies. As a result of the tension, Congress unnecessarily limited the agency's statutory discretion. An understanding of the true definition of § 701(a)(2)
would have provided Congress and the agency with the crucial question in the case: does the agency have the ability to act pursuant to
independent lawmaking authority in the area of the delegation? By
focusing on this question, Congress and the agency can determine
more accurately whether a broad delegation is permissible, allowing
Congress to delegate broadly and expand the agency's statutory authority where the agency has an independent source of authority.
CONCLUSION

The true "independent authority" definition of the "committed to
agency discretion" exception resolves the tension between the exception, as it is currently understood through the "no law to apply" definition, and the nondelegation doctrine. The true definition makes clear
that a finding that a statute commits action to agency discretion by
providing no law to apply is constitutional because the Court only
makes such a finding where the agency is acting pursuant to independent authority. In addition, this understanding of § 701(a)(2) reveals the complete definition of the exception, that the "no law to apply" definition has failed to provide, by accurately explaining the Supreme Court's two-pronged "no law to apply" jurisprudence.

141 The Navy still had independent authority to act, but Congress had narrowed its discretion to act under the statutory delegation. The situation fell within Youngstown category twocongressional silence-as opposed to category one-congressional authorization. As a result, the
executive's authority was not at its maximum because it did not include "all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown, 343 US at 635-37.

